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THE UTTERANCE, THE BODY AND THE LAW: 




In what possible ways does the sacredness of a language have application in an 
everyday, concrete sense – in a contemporary context? If we want to discuss 
the sacredness of language, can we conceptualise such sacrality in anything 
other than an abstracted form? I will consider some places where a proposed 
sacredness of the Maori language might come to bear, and will particularly 
question its usage within the process of the law. My primary aim in this article 
is to conceive of ways, however hypothetical, by which the sacredness within 
Maori language might be removed from its current role of discursive entity and 
into the active life of the speaker. Thus Maori language, even in its colonized 
form, may once more take its own place within the spheres of the practical and 
the sacred at the same time.
INTRODUCTION
This article deals with the issue of whether or not one may experience the 
sacred elements of Maori language within its contemporary usage in New 
Zealand society and I raise the topic particularly because of my experience 
of working on the legal processing of claims before the Waitangi Tribunal. 
Reflecting on this experience has caused me to ponder on the perception of 
many New Zealand policy makers and writers of legislation that te reo Maori 
is a language covalent with English and capable of apparently effortless and 
transparent translation of meaning. Without reproducing the existing and ex-
tensive arguments about the complexity of the art/act of translation, nor those 
arguments which deal with the creation of cultural worlds through language 
and the theoretical analysis of language as a system of meaning, I would like 
to direct readers’ attention to the idea of the sacrality of language. In particular, 
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I wish to consider the sacredness of language as embodied by the speaker in 
their expression of certain sacred words.
Before doing so, it becomes necessary to note however, that there are social 
and political elements at work which can stifle usages of such words as ‘sacred’ 
and ‘spiritual’ in academic contexts. One of these, the New Age Movement, 
which is a recent, relatively young but nevertheless extremely efficient progeny 
of colonization (Linda Smith 1999: 102), has made it rather difficult for many 
of us to conceive of language as a spiritual event without sounding irrational. 
Rationalistic discourse about the theoretical use of language, although vastly 
different in its audience and aims to New Age discourses (which appropriate 
Indigenous Knowledges to romanticized Western formulaic storylines), has, 
in my own opinion, unintentionally colluded with the New Age Movement to 
ensure that words such as ‘sacred’, whenever uttered, are attended with some 
degree of intellectual distancing – frequently making them a topic of analysis 
and explanation rather than of embodied experience. Perhaps this discomfort 
is due also to such words’ complicity with mainstream churches; regardless, 
when the words which accompany the notion of sacred are submerged then 
so, arguably, is the notion itself. and yet it is this notion of the ‘sacred’ within 
language which is the topic of this article.1 I am mostly anxious to find a place 
for the sacred to slip back into, in this case, the academic sphere of language 
analysis, but in an embodied and experiential sense. Hence this article serves 
a dual role: it challenges orthodox, colonized (and therefore rationalistic) dis-
courses around language, and it also seeks to concretize this unmentionable 
‘sacred’.
In an attempt to explicate the sacred realm of the contemporary experience of 
language in New Zealand society, I have chosen mauri as a starting point to 
consider my central suggestion that language is a sacred entity. Where some 
may prefer – validly, I might add–to continue in the vein of describing the 
sacredness of language in abstracted academic terms, in this article I instead 
choose to apply this element of language to the contemporary process of the 
law in the context of two linguistic phenomena: first, the act of legal translation, 
and second the act of hearings, in both cases with regard to the Waitangi Tri-
bunal. The intention of this article is also to reflect on the natural cohabitation 
of whakapapa and the body, the body and language, and of whakapapa and 
language. I propose that the Maori language is just as capable of representing 
a colonizing discourse as the colonizing language itself and so I contemplate 
how language used in a hearing might affect the body and hence the whaka-
papa of the speaker, and how we can conceive of the sacredness of language as 
having a place in current, colonized times.
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ASPECTS OF SACREDNESS IN MAORI BELIEF AND PRACTICE
Mauri
The concept of mauri defies exact definition, and perhaps it is only right that 
this is so, for as I later argue, its form constantly changes, and the essentialist 
practice of describing it tightly by definition could be inappropriate. Many 
writers have described its emergence within all that exists, while acknowledg-
ing its changeability, but in a loose sense mauri can be taken to refer to ‘life-
force’ and is associated with an element of sacredness. Mauri can also be de-
scribed as originating from physical aspiration; hence it is often referred to in 
the same breath as the Maori word for sneeze, in the following tauparapara:
Tihei mauri ora
I sneezed and therefore I live
It is totally by design that the above tauparapara is often invoked to begin a 
formalised speech. By introducing the notion of mauri, what follows within 
the oratory is demarcated as something quite sacred. It arguably also sets the 
scene for as great a focus on the emergence of the words themselves – their ut-
terance – as their strict meaning. It is as if the speaker is putting the listener on 
notice that the sound of the sneeze can propel itself into the world of life. The 
sneeze claims further prominence in the breath of life of Tane. Tane was said 
to have breathed life into Hine-ahu-one with his hau, or breath. Hineahuone 
then sneezed, thus affirming the life given to her (Robinson 2005: 38).2 Mauri 
may then be concomitant with life, and its mention in the above tauparapara 
reminds the speaker and their audience of the living dimension.3
Mead (2003: 54) emphasizes the necessity of the link between life and mauri. 
He argues that mauri enables the physiological processes of the body to take 
place and also invigorates the human personality. Spontaneity, creativity, vi-
brancy – these are all aspects of the human condition dependent on mauri. 
Mauri innervates the body and the personality; when mauri departs, the body 
is dead. The mauri may depart over time, indicating that the body is physically 
dead but not ‘dead’ in a traditional, cultural sense; the continued acknowl-
edgement of the tupapaku in the tangihanga process might affirm this as-
pect of some extant life.4 Moreover, traditional Maori were extremely familiar 
with the belief that one’s mauri could be adversely affected by makutu. Walker 
(2004: 67), for instance, talks about tohunga who were specialists at ‘casting 
spells’ to make people sick, perhaps resulting in at least a state of ill-health 
or even death. Thus those who were trained in whare maire were taught the 
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practice of influencing the mauri of an object or a person through uttering 
‘spells’. Similarly the late tohunga Hohepa Kereopa reminds us that language 
has its own mauri:
… people have forgotten that karakia have their own mauri …. The 
mauri gives karakia its impact. Because if I just say the words of a 
karakia without any mauri, then it has no impact. (Moon 2003: 87)
Very similar, and perhaps identical, to the phenomenon of mauri is that of 
hau. The distinction between the two is difficult to articulate but deserves 
attention, particularly as the two terms are often used interchangeably. As 
with mauri, hau vitalizes (Salmond 1997: 176) and its use within the phrase 
hau ora places greater emphasis on the infusion of life into the body – as with 
Hineahuone, for instance. It is not locatable in any part of the body but moves 
throughout (Best 2005 [1924]: 51); it can also move outside the body whilst 
shifting constantly throughout it. Like mauri, hau departs the body at death. 
Salmond (1997: 510), however, argues that hau is protected by mauri, and that 
the wairua, another term often used in conjunction with mauri, protects the 
body. Marsden (2003: 44) believes that mauri-ora and hau-ora are one and 
the same and may be used interchangeably. Often hau-ora is a phrase used in 
conjunction with the notion of ‘health’, particularly in contemporary times, 
whereas mauri, while indicating the health status of a person, cannot be re-
duced to that usage.5
We begin to recognize that the phenomena behind the terms are interdepend-
ent and may not remain static within the terms themselves. This is not sur-
prising when we consider that mauri was traditionally said to be inherent to 
creation; given the vastness of nature, we can expect mauri to wear diverse 
masks. Mauri resides in fish, rocks and mountains and a mauri, or talisman 
(Papakura 1938: 221), naturally enough, contained mauri. According to Best 
(2005[1924]: 32) wairua, instead, was ‘…that which leaves the body at death’, 
suggesting that it is wairua alone that departs. This view challenges Mead’s 
description of the action of mauri at death: it appears that the phenomenon 
of mauri can assume various guises, reflecting itself in the different names at-
tributed to it by different writers.6
One very real manifestation of mauri occurs when the names of Io are men-
tioned. Generally the name Io is believed to be so sacred that, like the Jewish 
name for the Supreme spirit, it is never articulated lightly (Cowan 1930: 55). 
Whenever the various names of Io were mentioned, the context in which they 
were placed likewise possessed mauri. Thus the various states of Te Kore, or 
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that period of creation which valued nothingness, were imbued with mauri 
simply by virtue of their association, and simultaneous development, with Io 
(Robinson 2005: 297):
Ko te Kore The void without anything
Te Kore-te-whiwhia The void without understanding
Te Kore-te-kerekere The void without identification
Te Kore-te-tauamaua The void without time or space limits
Te Kore-te-matua The void without origin
These states of being are placed alongside Io to indicate his link with Kore 
(ibid: 298)
Io-mata-moe Io the Slumbering One
Io-kore-te-whiwhia Io the One Without
Io-mata-ngaro Io of the Unseen Face
Io-roa Io the Eternal One
Io-matua-kore Io the Parentless One
We may then associate mauri with constant becoming. The above depiction of 
the states of Te Kore illustrates the constant movement of Io through various 
stages. With this evident dynamism it would be a mistake to imagine that 
mauri suddenly ceases to move; indeed, it is the constant flux of mauri that 
both moves outwards from the names of Io and additionally gives us the ability 
to perceive that Io has these names from the outset.
How one perceives mauri also needs to be addressed as it is likely that all 
senses were brought to bear in detecting the presence of mauri. While there 
is a scarcity of literature dealing with modes of sensation or perception in the 
traditional Maori world, a belief in the presence of mauri would (one conjec-
tures) probably have beeen sensed through various faculties7 – through the 
appearance of tohu (signs), through matakite (second sight), as well as touch, 
smell and sight. With the emergence of mauri in all, diverse phenomena, and 
the description of mauri through multiple discourses and terms, it is to be 
expected that mauri may be perceptible in flashes or certain instances. Where 
and when mauri reveals itself are examples of when one may traditionally 





This is a concept also important to any discussion of the sacredness of Maori 
language. In a banal sense, whakapapa can be defined as genealogy, or tax-
onomy, through which Maori made sense of the world. Whakapapa here is 
a tool through which Maori could see links between the phenomena of the 
natural world and thus work a form of science into a ‘database’ (Williams 
2001: 16). In relation to the flora and fauna classification system, Maori were 
apparently adept at structuring the natural world so that there was a consistent 
explanation for its existence (ibid). Similarly, the names of people comprised 
whakapapa and were rote learned so that they could be passed on to forthcom-
ing generations. This rendition of whakapapa considers that whakapapa is a 
creation of mankind and that it is a useful mechanism for survival; generally 
speaking, names are placed in particular orders by those knowledgeable in 
genealogy.
Some writers, however, allude to a precursor to human intervention, by ac-
knowledging the eternal event of mauri. Marsden and Henare (1992) tacitly 
refer to the necessity for the presence of mauri so that whakapapa can exist, 
and the converse. They state that Tua Uri – the energy which makes up the 
universe – is the location of genealogical creation (ibid: 14), and that creation 
and mauri are interdependent (ibid: 9). Mauri itself had originated in Te Po 
(Marsden 2003: 181) and may precede whakapapa. It is safe to assume, however, 
that both enliven each other, for if to possess mauri is to be alive, then this 
requires the belief and practice of whakapapa. In fact, it may be erroneous to 
suggest that a linear sequence of events exists in relation to whakapapa and 
mauri, for it is through whakapapa that mauri can be infused into the natural 
world.8 What remains important is the interdependence of each event; mauri 
is said to bind the body and the spirit together (Barlow 1991: 83), for instance, 
and thus ensures that life continues.
The body in a state of flux9
Where the body is bound to spirit, mauri as a changing, vital source ensures 
that the body itself is constantly in a state of change. As already mentioned, 
innervation of the physiological functions of the body occurred through the 
vibrant existence of mauri, which also ensures the spiritual change of the body. 
For John Rangihau (1992: 190), for instance, being Tuhoe before being Maori 
is as much a matter of spiritual diversity as of localized knowledge. In this 
light the idea that a group of people can shift form according to the terri-
tory that they are currently located in is one that is particularly relevant for 
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Maori. As complex as the notion is, for the Western world, that Maori are 
totally constructed by all that surrounds them, for Maori any assertion that 
an individual, and groups, are uniformly the same regardless of their location 
is equally disconcerting.
Maori would also assert that the body is meant to retain its changeability in 
order to protect the integrity of its whakapapa and the mauri. Often this oc-
curred to glean knowledge; Hinetitama for example was one who became 
Hinenuitepo, the goddess of death, and thus became knowledgeable about 
that aspect. Maui was another who encouraged discovery (Walker 1992: 174) 
and this he achieved by changing form on occasion, thus gaining experience 
about forms and states of being (Mika 2005: 48).
Additionally, the mauri of the body, or indeed of other objects, may be sensitive 
to a context. It is widely accepted in Maori belief, for instance, that a person 
can fall sick if in a place that has not been ‘cleansed’.10 Physical manifestations 
abound; a tupapaku could become extremely heavy if about to be moved to 
a particular location; the movement of a mauri (talisman) from one location 
to another can alter its function without any other intervention; the wrong 
recitation of whakapapa can make young members of a whanau sick, and so 
on. While land is physically significant, it is therefore also spiritually vital, as 
it allows the full expression of the link between mauri and whakapapa. The 
interplay between the objects around the body and the body itself, again vital-
ized by mauri, means that the body is in a constant state of change.
A state of flux is therefore vital to the integrity of mauri and thus of the body. 
The practice of naming a newborn was also one that protected this state of 
change of the body. Naming through reference to whakapapa was a careful 
exercise but also a joyful one. Specific occurrences surrounding a birth, con-
sidered alongside the whakapapa of the newborn, would assist the hapu with 
names. The child might be given a host of names to allow it to link and align 
their being to particular locations. Throughout life, that same person might 
be known by one of those names within an area; the name could change as 
the territory changed. Care had to be taken when naming a newborn, though: 
bestowing too many names from various sides of the family on a child could 
create confusion, reflecting itself eventually in the child’s behaviour (Moon 
2003: 95). The individual mauri of each name would conflict unless the child 
were named appropriately.
Naming and reference still show flashes of these traditional beliefs. One would 
still be careful to call someone else by a name which was suitable for a par-
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ticular location, even though the person may bear a number of names. Care 
had also to be taken when reciting whakawai, or translating ancestral sayings, 
where behind the words lay the mana of a number of authors, who immedi-
ately connected to the mana of particular lakes, mountains, and other whenua 
(Seed-Pihama 2004: 50).
The connection between mauri of the body and of words
For Maori the metaphysical dimension to words is evident. Royal (2006: 5), a 
Maori writer, considers that the sacred realm generally was linked to mana. 
Mana was ubiquitous, and was responsible for such magnificent feats as pro-
jecting one’s voice over a vast distance. From this account mana appears simi-
lar to mauri, but perhaps more directly related to human agency; one’s ability, 
or indeed permission, to speak could therefore originate from the presence 
of mana. Many writers refer to mauri when discussing sacredness generally. 
Tuhoe tohunga, Hohepa Kereopa, as previously mentioned has alluded to the 
importance of mauri in karakia and indigenous people often speak of language 
being sacred within consciously sacred contexts. In other words the scene is 
set, frequently through ceremony, to make language sacred. Integrity is all im-
portant in the uttering of words in these contexts; a prayer offered by a Navajo 
tribal member, contemplating the necessity to always speak the truth, would 
not only ensure a moral outcome of an action but would also ensure that the 
words being uttered were protected (Abram 1996: 70). Prayer or incantation for 
indigenous people, then, could ensure the outcome of a desired effect. Maori 
believed that words had to be uttered with respect, so that the environment did 
not take offence, and the kauwae runga ensured that the integrity of karakia 
was retained through cautious invocation. Te Matarohanga, the tohunga and 
informant who documented the activities of the kauwae runga, posited that 
tohunga could assist learning through invocations that ensured the taught in-
formation was accepted and retained by the student. Students and tohunga had 
to utter these karakia with care, however – forgetting their sequence, omitting 
necessary words from them, could have disastrous consequences. Tikao, of Kai 
Tahu, was one such tohunga who cautioned against forgetting parts of karakia. 
He recounted an instance where another tohunga forgot the words to a karakia 
and died shortly thereafter (Beattie 1990: 93). Closely related was the act of 
korero tipuna, the act of talking about one’s ancestors, which was considered 
a sacred act (ibid: 74). Those participating in these discussions would not eat 
until the discussions were finished.
However, words may still be sacred even though not used in so-called sacred 
situations. Tikao for instance had already described a stand of trees at Akaroa 
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being inhabited by the name and hence the spirit of a woman, enabling it 
to speak (Beattie 1990; 89-90). And within the very words used in everyday 
speech, sound played a huge part in ensuring the presence of the environment. 
Raerino (2000: 1) states that words directly reflect an aural relationship with 
nature:
Kai roto i ngā kupu me ngā momo kōrero, waiata, haka me ngā 
karakia a te Māori ngā oro o te taiao. Ko ngā oro nei hai tūhono i te 
ao tangata, ki te ao o te wao. Ko ngā momo oro hai tūhono i te ao 
kikokiko ki te ao wairua, te ira tangata ki te ira atua.
Within words and the diversity of talk, songs, performance and 
prayers of the Maori, resides the sounds of the world around us. 
These sounds link man to the world of the environment. These sorts 
of sounds connect the bodily realm to the spiritual realm, the intrin-
sic humanness to the intrinsic godliness. (own trans)
The link that he emphasizes is the continual presence of the environment by 
the utterance of the word.
Words possess human-like qualities and Raerino refers to them as having a 
whakapapa. He comments on the interplay between the word kupu11and the 
various states of being which Maori adhere to in their beliefs, such as tapu. 
Immediately the ‘ku’ component of the word ‘kupu’ links the sound and the 
meaning of a word (ibid: 39), such that the two are interdependent. Thus the 
sacredness of this word is seen immediately in its components, which are tra-
ditionally seen as so interrelated that they are indivisible. The creation of the 
universe by Io was another phenomenon which displayed the inherent power 
of words: Io spoke what was considered to be a holy word to advance the 
light so that balance could prevail (Robinson 2005: 23). This ‘word’ was in fact 
a collection of words which could nevertheless have more impact by being 
considered in their totality as one phrase – or word.
Although the more pedestrian form of speech is often described as noa, this 
does not necessarily remove it from the realm of sacredness. Sometimes, for 
instance, older generations preferred to remain silent, deciding not to ask 
questions, because the moment was not an appropriate one to be speaking, 
although the questions asked were ordinary and seemingly noa. Cherryl Smith 
(2007: 70) remarks that even the act of asking a question, while appearing to be 
a hallmark of curiosity and intelligence, could disrupt the flow of activity. She 
believes that older generations regarded the act of questioning as interrupting 
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the learning process, where observation was paramount. How it interrupts 
the learning process deserves attention. If the act of speaking was sacred, if 
words themselves were imbued with mauri, then it was unwise to speak at 
inappropriate times. Such a belief still exists in modern times amongst Maori, 
where to speak across someone is not just discourteous but also has potential 
consequences for the disrupter, particularly in the regions of whaikorero but 
also in everyday situations.12
To draw some parallels with western philosophical traditions of language, both 
pre-colonial Maori and pre-Aristotlean Greek societies remarked prolifically 
on the metaphysical nature of language. Plato announced that there was a 
corresponding Form ‘… wherever we have several things all called by the 
same name’ (Bostock 1994: 15). The Phaedrus reiterates Plato’s earlier asser-
tion that we knew what the Forms really were in previous lives and that only 
an everyday sense of what they are now remains. For Plato, we are left with 
language which describes this dimmer sense. That we can talk about them at 
all is proof that our souls have witnessed them in their true sense and that 
we have some knowledge of them. Despite modifying his views to a certain 
extent, in particular those which formed inherent contradictions, Plato did 
hold fast to the belief that the Form gave meaning to a general word (Bostock 
1994: 23). Plato further argued that a universal property, its archetype, gave 
an object its unique structure and condition (Tarnas 1991: 6). This particular 
Platonic theory prompted some colourful debate around language, where a 
critic of Plato stated: ‘I see particular horses, but not horseness’, to which Plato 
retorted: ‘That is because you have eyes but no intelligence’ (ibid: 8). It is at this 
point that I see a divergence in the beliefs of pre-Aristotlean Greek ideas and 
those of indigenous peoples: there is more than one mechanism that renders 
objects sacred in indigenous societies. Heidegger refers to the unconcealment 
of Being (Clark 2002: 23); sacredness may undertake a similar motion, or else 
it may move in the spiral shape reflected in nature, but it is likely to emanate 
from many different sources in the seen and unseen environment. Sacredness 
may not be attributable to one specific essence but may manifest itself through 
an interplay of a number of realms. Certainly much of Maori belief in their 
creation stories reflects the constant chaos of change. The Io explanations of 
creation, for example, demonstrate a constant folding over of states of nature 
such that they all created the universe and could not be isolated into their 
specific mechanisms.
In the subsequent section of this article, I turn to a consideration of these 
notions of sacred language within the specific example of the Waitangi Tri-
bunal.
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THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL – BODY AND WORDS
In a Maori world the body is sensitive to both the words it utters and the words 
directed towards it. The body being imbued with mauri, words are also infused 
with mauri, and it comes as no surprise that Maori perceived a relationship 
between wellbeing and words. Traditionally, waiata Maori assisted healing 
through their ability to align the energy of the body with the spiritual (Browne 
2005: 4), and a word being uttered would possess inherent sacred significance. 
If Maori are truly holistic, placing as great an emphasis on the spiritual realm 
as on the physical and social aspects of the body, then what of the impact of 
legal discourse, the instrumentality of the words used in a legal process, on the 
mauri of the body described above? If what Broekman (1986: 376) maintains 
– that the ‘…existential dimension of the human individual is excluded’ – is 
true, then there is a likelihood that the words brought into being during the 
process of a hearing, for instance, impact spiritually on the delicate thread of 
whakapapa also. My own interest in the discourse of law, its instrumentality 
and thereafter its impact on the Maori body first became apparent when I was 
representing clients in the Waitangi Tribunal context. I was mainly involved 
in the writing component of submissions but occasionally appeared in the 
actual hearings. At different stages of the hearing process I saw opportunities 
where the integrity of the mauri of the word, and, if Browne cited above is 
correct, then also the integrity of the body, could be affected throughout these 
various stages.
‘Whenua’ and ‘land’ – a disparity of presencing
While I undertook this role I witnessed what could possibly have been a deeper 
phenomenon than just general client disillusionment with the Waitangi Tri-
bunal process. By this I mean that those of us immersed in this situation, par-
ticularly as lawyers, automatically saw the obvious: that the Waitangi Tribunal 
grappled with the disparities between the cultural meaning of concepts and 
terminology, and the lack of meaningful fit evidently upset our clients. In a 
similarly superficial way we also witnessed the defence of the Crown and thus 
the indignation of our clients at the Crown’s responses. However, these situ-
ations always benefit from a more profound critical analysis, and at all stages 
of a legal process one might be able to identify possibly even more primal 
effects of language. The stages of preparing for a hearing generally are many; 
one of the basic steps which occurs early on involves the need to familiarise 
oneself with the relevant statutes. During the foreshore and seabed controversy, 
I assisted my colleagues with the writing up of submissions, and recall being 
bogged down in the minutiae of the provisions of the Maori Land Act 1993. At 
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some late point I glanced at the title of the Act and saw its Maori equivalent 
– Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. I then remembered the other meaning of 
whenua13 – afterbirth – and began to think about not so much the meaning of 
Maori words but their inherent worth. I began to suspect that, although a shell 
of meaning can be transmitted through translation, the sacred manifestation 
of the word whenua was not done justice in its supposed equivalent of ‘land’. 
Hence I began to wonder if land and whenua shared nothing in common, 
since whenua required the sensation of its everchanging power and ‘being’ as 
part of the word.
I mention ‘being’ because at about this time also I had begun to read some of 
Heidegger’s work. He maintains that ‘Language is the house of Being’. Intrigu-
ingly he also wrote simply that ‘Language speaks’ (Heidegger 2001: 191).14 In 
giving language the power to speak itself, he effectively disrupts the notion that 
language is created by man, a dominant belief which he laments as emerging 
from the crisis imposed by technology (Clark, 2002: 12), where language is 
never brought to us really as language but merely as a self-realising ‘… ra-
tional-logical explanation’ (Heidegger 2001: 191).15 In speaking, according to 
Heidegger, we are bringing to completion that which speaks – language (ibid). 
Further, language continues to speak even after the physical act of speech is 
past; speaking ‘… gathers the ways in which it persists as well as that which 
persists by it – its persistence, its presencing’ (ibid: 192). Thus the presence of 
speaking endures even after the physical act of speaking has taken place.
Although the words that Heidegger refers to are spoken ones (and the signifi-
cance of orality in legal discourse is something I discuss later), he does allow 
insight into language at its origin. Heidegger maintains that that which is the 
most purely spoken is the poetic (ibid).16 The word in poetry reaches out; 
poetry brings us nearer to language in the sense of naming, which, in turn, 
enables us to call – ‘calling brings closer what it calls’ (ibid: 196). When we call 
through the voice of poetry, we are not merely bringing forth what is being 
called to ‘… set it down in closest proximity to what is present, to find a place 
for it there’ (ibid); on the contrary, ‘…the call has already gone out to what it 
calls … Into the distance in which what is called remains, still absent’ (ibid). 
The call of poetry does not force what it calls away from the distance, because 
the calling keeps it there.
There is no doubt that this concept is difficult to grasp, but it is a vital one 
to much of Heidegger’s writings. We are not able to control the nearness or 
distance of language; instead language gives itself to us to speak. It seems that 
language can simultaneously be close and remote, even though poetry calls it 
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near. Heidegger puts to rest the dominant discourse of language as constantly 
being nearby for our constant use. He also resists the notion of language as 
being statically positioned – contained, measured and born of logic. But what 
is the significance of Heidegger’s arguments for the word ‘whenua’ in the con-
text of law? ‘Whenua’ calls into being a much greater presence than ‘land’. Its 
context is metaphorical; immediately it answers to the call of the whakapapa 
of the person writing or uttering it, although it cannot be controlled. It is not a 
special word in this regard; other Maori words are brought into being through 
a metaphorical utterance, although mauri may be that element which enables 
language to speak to us before we even utter the words. Thus the word when-
ua, moving outward from a context of metaphor and given fluidity through 
its whakapapa with the writer and the speaker, reaches out to the recipient, 
whether they are reading or hearing the word.
A further aspect of Heidegger’s calling is the ability of the presencing of the 
word to constantly shift. He states: ‘The calling calls into itself and therefore 
always here and there – here into presence, there into absence’ (ibid: 196). The 
presencing of ‘whenua’ may also move in and out of perception – again, not for 
human consumption. Like knowledge itself, which Maori traditionally viewed 
as manifesting itself in the form of a spiral such as the koru, the presencing of 
the word ‘whenua’ may reveal and conceal itself instantaneously, even in this 
same form as the koru. The calling of the word will bring forth the presencing 
of the word but not into permanent nearness and, hence, use. The focus on use, 
according to Heidegger, is part of the technological age; it reflects itself in the 
very use of the word ‘nature’, which focuses on fecundity and birth, on constant 
productivity, rather than its earlier ‘physis’ which referred to the ‘presencing’ of 
what-is-merely-present’ (Wolcher 2004: 264). Even in the word nature there is 
inherently imbued in its origin a belief that nature can be created, and accord-
ingly adapted for use by humankind.
Seemingly the word ‘whenua’ escapes an English equivalent – not simply be-
cause of its apparent reference to a number of simultaneous objects, such as 
land and afterbirth, but also because of what it is.
THE HEARING PROCESS
Having talked to the clients throughout the preparation phase, and analysed 
the relevant statutes, the hearing may now take place. Generally, much of the 
investigation into legal discourse reveals the complicity of state power with 
language so that the body is caught up within a sphere of legal absolutism; 
within a hearing, meaning is standardised so that the subject’s perception of 
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the world is transformed (Broekman 1986: 376).17 Hearings require actors, in 
the form of the subjects, lawyers, judges, and juries; the narratives that they 
encourage make the relations between the actors concrete and spectacular 
(Umphrey 1999: 412). In the Waitangi Tribunal context, despite the informal 
appearance and the inquisitorial nature of its brief, there still exist these actors 
with, of course, the addition of those aspects of Maori culture that are the point 
of grievance. Within these actors resides the ability to gaze and to hear; a ‘hear-
ing’ provides a forum for the recitation to be listened to. The Waitangi Tribunal 
hearing is evidence of the importance of the uttered word, and all participants 
in the process are in some way or other affected by the standardising of the 
stories. Audiences to these narratives now have a careful and logical body of 
stories to consume (ibid: 397). Differing from a Maori situation of tikanga 
where a Maori audience would share whakapapa to the Maori participant, and 
would therefore share a spiritual as well as a physical connection, the subject 
before the Waitangi Tribunal is engaged in a world of spectacle.
Shalleck (1993: 1733) considers directly the impact on the client of the legal 
process, and argues that the construction of a client occurs in the exercise of 
law, primarily in two stages. Firstly the client is stripped of individual iden-
tity; they are therefore completely removed from their social situation. This 
is an important step because it also replaces the context in which their case 
arose with the confines of the law. Their identities are then replaced with le-
gal discourse and considerations. They are basically defined by the courts, a 
phenomenon reminiscent of Foucault’s (1989) analysis of the body in relation 
to the medical profession. Furthermore, if we allow Shalleck’s argument, then 
the discourse which replaces their identities is more than tutelary (Schneider 
1996: 38); it is ‘…instinct with coercion and demands acquiescence’ (ibid). With 
the movement of the everyday, social context to the legal gaze, the transla-
tion of natural language into the language of the law also occurs (Broekman 
1986: 370), in which the subject is a ‘ … moment of the institution’ (ibid) and 
merely a bearer of legal rights and duties.
The ‘moment of the institution’ reveals itself for Maori in the giving of evidence. 
Generally when Maori seem to be speaking about whenua, ika, takutai moana 
and so on, they are actually also speaking to them in the sense that the words 
they use to refer to them are always linked by their bodily whakapapa to the 
physical manifestation of the words. They are arguably always calling the phys-
ical manifestation into existence every time they utter the word which talks to 
it. However, in the hearing process, the relationship of the witness to the sacred 
aspect being questioned about becomes defined at that moment as a product of 
observation, at which point the language that the witness responds with forces 
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the witness apart from the sacred aspect being asked about. The witness then 
does not talk to the phenomenon but about it. As well as being a product of 
the identity discourse provided by the law, additionally they are forced into a 
relationship where their response to the questioning lawyer is tightened. This 
process is ensured through what Broekman (1986: 374) describes as a jurifi-
cated world. In the context of the Waitangi Tribunal hearing the relationship 
of the witness to the hitherto sacred aspect referred to becomes objectified 
– inherent to the concept of the jurificated world but through the route of lan-
guage. It is as if the ‘moment of the institution’ is a frozen snapshot, facilitated 
by the uptake and use of the language of law.
HUMAN AGENCY: PROTECTING THE MAURI FROM INSTRUMENTAL LEGAL 
DISCOURSE
Foucault maintains that discourses actually construct social entities and reali-
ties (Fairclough 1992: 3–4). If this is so, then we need to consider how Maori 
might protect their own mauri from the instrumental nature of the language 
of law. Price (1999: 593) considers the possibility of mastering particular dis-
course as a means of addressing this problem – at least as a way of protecting 
socio-political interests. This approach is reminiscent of the push for Maori 
to become lawyers in recent years, ostensibly to tackle the tangible difficulties 
that Maori were facing in the courts. A further, and possibly related, reason for 
this drive was the education of Maori so that they could master and subvert the 
language of law for the use of their people. Where a positive outcome would 
ensue, the language would be seen to be neutrally malleable to the wielder. The 
immortal words of Ngata:
E tipu e rea, Mo nga ra o tou ao, Ko to ringa ki nga rakau a te Pakeha, 
Hei ara mo to tinana, Ko to ngakau ki nga taonga a o tipuna Maori, 
Hei tikitiki mo to mahuna, A ko to wairua ko to Atua, Nana nei nga 
mea katoa
Grow up and thrive for the days destined to you. Your hands to the 
tools of the Pakeha to provide physical sustenance. Your heart to the 
treasures of your ancestors as a diadem for your brow. Your soul to 
God to whom all things belong. (Trans: Keelan, (n.d))
are a reminder to many Maori that the language of law, amongst many other 
aspects of Western education, could be grasped by Maori whilst they maintain 
an essentially Maori identity.
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Maori have seemingly upturned the language of law in a number of ways: 
through the admission of Maori knowledge into the courts; by conducting 
hearings in Maori; by providing a Maori expert voice in cultural reports, and 
so on. Debate continues on whether these methods of resistance are sufficient. 
I would add to any voices of caution by saying that these measures are merely 
surface, that the admission of Maori knowledge into courts does very little to 
ensure that the inherent mauri of the Maori subject is protected. In a hearing 
situation, conducting a cross examination of a Maori defendant in the Maori 
language achieves the same outcome as a process conducted in English, be-
cause the language resorted to is still instrumental and designed to compel the 
defendant to form a desired response.
REMOVING TREATY ISSUES FROM THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL
As well as highlighting the need for a separate justice system, in his report Mo-
ana Jackson (1988) was illustrating the innate shortcomings of the court system, 
with particular emphasis on the criminal court process. The criminal process 
has been called into question in its inappropriateness for dealing with Maori, 
due to its overwhelmingly Western approach to the regulation of behaviour. 
The Waitangi Tribunal is heralded by many as being far more ‘Maori-friendly’ 
than, say, the District Court or even the Family Court. Often its agreeability is 
attributed to the fact that hearings can occur on the marae (and they are thus 
subject to the local kawa and tikanga), that Maori language is used freely, and 
that the Treaty of Waitangi is referred to without jurisdictional issues, and so 
on. The outcomes prompted by the Waitangi Tribunal may even be beneficial 
by some measures, although opinion is sharply divided on its ability to deliver 
equitable outcomes for Maori in terms of the return of their resources.
However, the Waitangi Tribunal may also need to be examined in the light of 
Jackson’s report, especially in relation to its quite uncritical use of legal dis-
course in its proceedings. The question of whether a Tribunal, by virtue of its 
very name, can exist without legal discourse is an interesting one to consider; 
the Tribunal may inherently cease to be if there were no lawyers and judges 
present. If we devoid the Tribunal of its jurificated language, though, then 
language may once again be allowed to flow freely in the ways in which we tra-
ditionally anticipated mauri would allow them to. Even the uttering of words 
might not take precedence in such a forum: Frame and Meredith (2004: 8) for 
instance discuss the example of the meeting of the tribes at Pukawa in 1856 to 
consider the Kingitanga. Citing Cowan, Frame and Meredith state:
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Each of the ropes representing these sacred mountains of the tribes 
was hauled taut and staked down, leaving Tongariro mountain in 
the middle, supported and stayed by all these tribal cords, and above 
floated the flag. Thus was the union of the tribes demonstrated.
Frame and Meredith continue by explaining that this event illustrates the way 
in which constitutional agreements were arrived at by ‘performance cultures’ 
(ibid). I would add that this symbolic arrangement also managed to avoid the 
use of instrumental, legal language altogether. This is not to say that language 
should not be used in contexts where it becomes necessary – after all, speech 
is the food of chiefs (ko te kai a te rangatira he korero) – but it would have to 
be used with some awareness that each word is alive and not merely something 
for denotation.
Of course Jackson’s reproach of the criminal justice system rests tacitly upon 
the premise that Maori do not need anything from the Crown in that context. 
However, the Waitangi Tribunal operates on the idea that Maori require, and 
may be rightfully entitled to, resources back from the Crown. Thus the Crown 
is always complicit in the proceedings as the process of having the resources 
returned must always involve them. How ready the Crown would be to accept 
that language must be acknowledged as living and not resting solely in the 
rigidity of legal discourse remains to be seen – the Crown has a hard enough 
job accepting that Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi guarantees a separate 
justice system, let alone acknowledging that a phenomenological approach to 
language must also compel this move! However, if the Crown and Maori were 
to consider a move towards another, non-legal means of discussing the return 
of resources then one of the elements galvanizing this move must be the fun-
damental, deep philosophical difference of phenomenological versus juridicial 
approaches to the nature and meaning of language. With the repositioning of 
language as a sacred phenomenon, Maori are much more likely to retain the 
kind of freedom that their language necessitates.
CONCLUSION
Without a doubt, a phenomenological approach to language would still involve 
denotation; however it would also accommodate the recognition that language 
is foremost a sacred entity, inseparable from the body. It is this interrelation-
ship which makes the body so receptive to the words directed toward it or 
about it. Western law, on the other hand, is a foremost inheritor of the domi-
nant idea that language is an instrument of precision and in that sense the 
body is not predominantly seen to be primordially or fundamentally sensitive 
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to the words directed at it. In the context of the theory I have considered here, 
the uncritical practice of translation, while important in law, could only occur 
with the awareness that language is a sacred event. Judicial forums, including 
the Waitangi Tribunal, inherently non-Maori in their forum and view of lan-
guage, need to be challenged in their approaches to purifying language.
What has until now remained unspoken can indeed speak itself, as Heidegger 
maintains. How could we possibly write these assertions so that they are ap-
plied in an everyday context? If we consider the limitlessness of a sacred realm 
while theorizing we might be starting to get somewhere; I insist that that which 
dominant discourse tells us we should not contemplate is precisely the thing 
that we should be contemplating. In some cases there may be traditional stric-
tures around bodies of knowledge which prevent this from occurring, but I am 
alluding more to a creative process of reflection that does not emphasise the 
recollection of traditional facts or the recounting of inductive knowledge. In 
other words, entertaining extraordinary theories around apparently self-evi-
dent phenomena, such as language, liberates us from colonization and disturbs 
any illusions of the authentic that we entertain. We are then able to normalise 
that which has, through colonized times, been made abnormal: that which lies 
on the outer, in the sky, in the dark or beyond the veil.
NOTES
1 I am loathe to suggest a translation for ‘sacred’ into Maori, simply because the 
meaning attributed to the word ‘sacred’ might not have existed in traditional 
Maori times. This is not to say that the hallmarks of a sacred state were not 
present, as I go on to suggest with my analysis of mauri. Some writers often 
equate ‘tapu’ with ‘sacred’; however, I am aware that much of the true meaning of 
Maori words has been lost, and I cannot willingly commit to this translation.
  While it may be easy to equate these two terms, ‘sacred’ derives from Latin 
sacrare or holy, and thus springs from an entirely other etymological origin to 
‘tapu’. Although the task of translators might be to find the most symmetrical 
term which can be best understood, one of the drawbacks of their work is the 
eventual loss, and perhaps distortion, of the original meaning of the word deriv-
ing particularly from the colonized group. I have provided rough translations 
throughout this article but remain aware that to do so is to perhaps engage in 
a problematic task: that of dragging a colonizing world over into a colonized 
one (particularly if we do agree that language is a sacred phenomenon), thereby 
contributing to a colonizing practice. Indeed, a similar theme is the dominant 
feature of this article.
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2 While it is suggested that Tane created Hineahuone, Papatuanuku (Earth Moth-
er), the father of Tane, was one atua who enabled her creation to occur by indi-
cating the location of human essence in her body (Pihama 2001:17). The input 
of the female element into the creation of Hineahuone is often overlooked.
3 I have also heard some speakers exclaim ‘tihei mauri mate’ at tangihanga, which 
could be an additional reminder that the dead also possess mauri. The daughter 
of Hinenuitepo and Tane, although retaining the mauri of her parents, became 
Hinenuitepo, who has become known as the Goddess of Death; thus it is rea-
sonable to believe that Hinenuitepo retained the original mauri of her former 
persona, and continues to share it with the dead.
4 Of course no-one can be too sure of exactly when mauri departs the body, al-
though some tohunga may be able to perceive this event. This uncertainty has 
been alluded to by Morioka (1995, n.p) in relation to the Japanese aversion to 
organ donation, where some Japanese differ from the West about when a per-
son is ‘dead’. The pursuit to try and isolate the point at which the soul departs 
the body has resulted in some bizarre experiments: see Roach (2004: 173), for 
instance, who recounts the weighing of six patients before and after death. Dr 
Duncan MacDougall, who made observations, noted that the weight loss of each 
patient after death amounted to three-quarters of an ounce.
5 Marsden (2003: 440) explains that mauri-ora and hau-ora are synonymous in 
relation to animate objects. Only mauri (without the adjective ‘ora) can be used 
in reference to inanimate objects.
6 It is worthwhile to keep in mind that Best’s writings are often challenged by 
other authors: see for instance Simpson (1997) who argues that Best’s European 
preconceptions immediately flavoured his preference for the Io stories.
7 Marsden and Henare (1992: 9) mention the incapacity of the ‘sense perception’ 
to apprehend the rhythmical patterns of energy, of which mauri is a part.
8 Here, there is a similarity between Maori belief and Russell’s (1961) recitation of 
Heraclitus’ mystic tradition: ‘All things come out of the one, and the one out of all 
things.’(p.59). Whether the ‘one’ is God, or a God-type figure, is a matter of much 
controversy amongst Maori.
9 Again, Russell provides a summation of Heraclitus’ flux, which I will draw on: 
‘We step and do not step into the same rivers: we are, and are not’ is perhaps the 
best-known saying of Heraclitus’, along with ‘The sun is new every day’. Both 
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aphorisms express Heraclitus’ belief that, although permanence appears to exist, 
nevertheless it is the process which is permanent and not the substance (Russell 
1961: 64). Thus Heraclitus’ central fire is always changing but exists always. In a 
similar way, I argue that the body is never the same, through its innervation by 
mauri.
10 Whakapure or whakanoa are the Maori terms for the process of cleansing.
11 Kupu can be translated as word.
12 Implicating the practice of research, prospective informants may be reluctant 
to speak, where they formerly indicated they might. This would explain the 
often frustrating attempts of researchers to access information in oral interviews, 
where questions are ignored and the words are allowed to emerge without the 
prompting of questions.
13 Aspects of the sacredness of this particular word might originate from its dual 
meaning, although this inference is somewhat different from the application of 
Heidegger’s theory of the ‘calling’ of words to the word whenua, which I discuss 
presently. Note, however, that Heidegger’s Fourfold immediately infers an in-
volvement of all the Four, even when only one of the Four is mentioned – they 
are together in a ‘simple oneness’ (Heidegger 2001: 147). In a more linguistic 
fashion, Luberda (n.d:2) refers to monosemic and polysemic language – the 
former being the linear derivative of science and the latter possessing non-linear, 
metaphorical depth where words contain a number of meanings.
14 Interestingly, Hohepa Kereopa claims that we cannot even take for granted that 
language is a human possession. He states: ‘There are different types of Te Reo 
[language] …. So when you go to talk to the pipis or you go to talk to the trees, 
you have a transformation in the type of Te Reo you use. You need that so the 
pipis or the trees can understand you.’ (Moon 2003: 134)
15 Language as a tool, as a means of designating what is useful and what is good 
and just, is a belief which can be traced back to Aristotle. Aristotle (1988:3) 
advocated for an approach to language which demarcates us from our animal 
counterparts; he asserted that language in the form of speech could only be pos-
sible because humans are unique. For Aristotle, language introduced humans 
to the world of choice and political communication. In so doing it provided hu-
mans with a power to indicate what was harmful and what would be beneficial 
to the group (Chilton 2004: 5). The speaking of language would evolve so that 
political functions could be performed. Other later philosophers, such as Locke, 
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placed ideational significance on language, so that it was merely an expression 
of the content-bearing mental state of the speaker at the time (Lycan 2000: 78). 
As famous as he was for his maxim that the mind is initially a tabula rasa, it is 
hardly surprising that Locke should locate the significance of language solely in 
the mental, since his maxim presumed the mind’s pride of place in acquiring 
knowledge also. At this stage English was quickly moving towards becoming 
standardized through such phenomena as the advent of the King James Bible 
(Fennell 2001: 137), and was losing its variability.
  An echo of Aristotle’s instrumentalist philosophy of language continued 
through until the present day. Further attempts at the construct of language as 
a tool of meaning – language as a meaningful utterance or expression of words 
– emerged with the Verificationists in the 1930s.
  Verificationism was driven by the logical positivists, who believed that the 
sentence being uttered must make a difference to future experience (Lycan 
2000:118) and that its meaning could be divined according to whether one could 
find a set of experiences to verify it. The sentence could hence be said to be 
either true or false. Although analytically true sentences were true because of 
the meaning of the words, most sentences were not accorded this privilege and 
were open to the kind of scrutiny afforded by verificationism.
16 Heidegger states, however, that prose is not the opposite of poetry (Heidegger, 
2001: 205). Pure prose is as poetic as poetry (ibid: x). Albert Hofstadter, in his 
introduction to Heidegger’s Poetry, Language and Thought, attributes the di-
chotomy between the two terms of poetry and prose to a lack of equivalence in 
English for the verb dichten, which Heidegger uses. Dichten is freely and liberally 
translated as the writing of poetry.. Hofstadter equates dichten with the thought-
ful composition of poetry or other literature (ibid). The verb dichten, does not 
sit comfortably with a notion of mere representation within language; it instead 
‘…bids to come the entire fourfold of earth and sky, mortals and divinities …’ 
(ibid). The thoughtful writer must speak of the fourfold while recounting what 
he or she sees or hears.
17 Legal language focuses on the precision of words, which has led to some advo-
cating that the legislature, the judiciary and the legal profession use less complex 
forms of it (Crystal 1987: 386). We could argue that the objectivity, even the 
complexity, of legal language is a necessity, but would still have to contend with 
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